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The case-study describes the situation involving Whole Foods Market, Jana Partners and 
Amazon. The case-study describes the situation for Whole Foods Market and the 
shareholder activism by Jana Partners leading up to the take-over bid announcement by 
Amazon on June 16th 2017, when the Whole Foods Market management team invited 
shareholders to a special meeting to vote on the approval of the merger. The 
accompanying teaching note for the case-study addresses the financial analysis and 
valuation of Whole Foods, the rationale behind the merger, value creation through 
shareholder activism and the EPS fallacy as a measure of value creation. 





On June 16th 2017, Amazon.com Inc. (“Amazon”) announced its plans to acquire Whole 
Foods Market Inc. (“Whole Foods”) at $42 a share, a total deal value of $13.7 billion, 
representing a 27% premium on Whole Foods’ closing price the previous day.  
Whole Foods wrote a letter to their shareholders, inviting them to attend a special meeting 
and asking them to consider and vote to approve the merger agreement (see Exhibit 1 for 
Letter to Whole Foods Market Shareholders for Merger Approval). They considered the 
offer to be of attractive value, the best alternative for maximizing shareholder value, high 
certainty of value (due to being an all-cash offer), had a high likelihood of completion 
and had the approval of their financial advisors, Evercore. 
Jana Partners, the activist shareholders that held nearly 9% of Whole Foods at the time, 
having entered the position only a few months prior, was wondering how they should act 
in response to the Amazon offer.  
After consecutive disappointing results, Whole Foods Market shareholders had grown 
impatient, expecting more action to be taken by the management team to turn the 
company around and return to the results Whole Foods had accustomed them to.  
For Jana, the lack of demanded change in Whole Foods made Amazon’s offer very 
attractive. At $42 per share, Jana was looking to make approximately $300 million in 
profit, a return of ~38%. Amazon made it clear that this was their final offer, as they were 
unwilling to participate in a bid war. The market seemed to expect more, as the Whole 
Foods share price rose above the announced $42 per share in the offer, eager for a higher 





Whole Foods Market 
About Whole Foods Market 
Whole Foods Market is an American supermarket chain, founded in 1978 in Austin, 
Texas, when Safer Way Natural Foods and Clarksville Natural Grocery joined forces to 
launch themselves into the supermarket format in the natural foods industry. Starting at 
less than half a dozen stores, in the United States, they averaged 8 million store visits 
across their 456 stores, located in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, 
although the United States stores are responsible for 97% of their sales and long-lived 
assets.  
Whole Foods’ product offering is varied, dividing themselves into the following 
departments: Bakery, Beer, Cheese, Coffee & Tea, Grocery, Meat & Poultry, Produce, 
Seafood, Whole Body and Pets.  
The company prides itself on its strict quality standards (see Exhibit 3 for list of quality 
standards) and food safety measures. The goal is to provide healthy food in a manner that 
is environmentally sustainable, hence why they name themselves “America’s Healthiest 
Grocery Store”. Their food safety measures include controlling the presence of arsenic in 
their rice, bisphenol-A in their plastic containers and methylmercury levels in their 
seafood. Further actions taken to ensure environmental awareness include sourcing from 
local farmers, which they work with to ensure responsible uses of pesticides and 
pollinators, and appropriate meat sourcing, to ensure animal right compliance by those 
who raise the cattle. Thanks to this control over their supply and manufacturing process, 





A Struggling Company 
Since peaking in 2015, Whole Foods stock largely underperformed over the next two 
years (see Exhibit 4 for comparison of cumulative returns against the S&P500). Despite 
increasing sales over this period, margins were on a downward trend due to increased 
costs (see Exhibit 5 for Whole Foods Market financial data). In early February 2017, the 
company announced through its quarterly earnings report that they were closing nine 
stores and updated their outlook to reflect lower expected sales growth and increased 
costs. Their sales growth expectations remained positive but same-store growth was fell 
(~2.5% decrease YTD), making it their sixth consecutive quarter of same-store sale 
decline. 
Organic food had started as a market niche but over the years became part of the 
mainstream market, so much so that, according to the Organic Trade Association (OTA), 
mass-market retailers were responsible for over half of organic food sales in 2015, 
whereas natural retailers were only responsible for ~37% (see Exhibit 6 for sale growth 
of organic market in the US). Taking Kroger, a major mass retailer, as an example: they 
launched an organic brand named Simple Truth in 2012, reaching $1 billion dollars in 
annual sales only 2 years after its launch, making it their most successful branch launch 
ever. Other retailers like Walmart and Aldi also increased the organic product offerings, 
with Costco believed to be the largest in terms of revenue (see Exhibit 7 for information 
on peers).  
This was initially unanticipated by Whole Foods and the increased competition, along 
with their delayed response, led to their poor results. For years they had the reputation of 
being overpriced, which earned them the nickname “Whole Paycheck”, alluding to how 
anyone going to Whole Foods would spend their whole paycheck at the store. According 
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to a survey conducted by Morgan Staley in 2017, 69% of interviewees don’t shop at 
Whole Foods because they can find lower prices elsewhere (70% in 2015 and 2016).  
The industry trend in recent previous years was already of consolidation, with several 
major acquisitions. Transaction values have increased greatly, whereas the number of 
deals has remained relatively stable (see Exhibit 8 for information on Food Retail M&A 
and Past Transactions). Large chains are able to take advantage of their infrastructure 
(smaller chain find it more difficult due to the high fixed costs) and can invest on other 
capabilities, such as optimizing supply chain, employing new technology to improve 
shopper experience and launching new products. 
 
Jana Partners 
Jana Partners is an investment management firm that describes itself as “specializing in 
event-driven investing”, by identifying and buying stocks in undervalued companies and 
using their acquired power as shareholders to make the changes they deem necessary to 
improve the company and exit the position when the value is created. This is more 
commonly known as shareholder activism. 
Between February and April 2017, Jana Partners acquired nearly 9% of Whole Foods, 
becoming its second-largest shareholder, with the intent of operational improvement, 
replacing members of the board of directors and finding potential buyers for the firm. 
Jana already had experience with other similar investments in the industry, like when they 
acquired 6% of Safeway in 2013 and sold off non-core assets or when they bought 7.2% 
of food packager ConAgra and divested underperforming assets.  
After disclosing their position, Jana Partners were very vocal in their criticism and held 
back no punches. They criticized brand development, customer service and the 
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company’s analytics and distribution strategy. They also proposed four new members for 
the board, arguing that it needed an overhaul in order to turn the company around and 
overcome the rough patch they were going through. 
 
Whole Foods Conflict 
Whole Foods management was unhappy with how the company’s issues were being dealt 
with publicly and attempted to bring to the table a peace offering: accept two of Jana’s 
board nominees if they agreed to stop the public agitation for two years. John Mackey, 
the CEO and one of Whole Food’s founders, said: “If Jana wants to have their own 
directors on the board, then they ought to be willing to sign a cooperation agreement”. 
Jana refused on the basis that “[they would] rather keep all options on the table”.  
The lack of cooperation between both parties reflected the relationship between the 
management team and the activist shareholders. In fact, calling it unfriendly would be an 
understatement, given that John Mackey called Jana Partners “greedy bastards”1 in an 
interview for Texas Monthly, accusing the hedge fund of attempting to destroying the 
company’s and the management’s reputation for a quick profit. 
Despite the disagreements with Jana Partners, changes were still needed and expected by 
other shareholders to turn around the company. In May 2017, Whole Foods announced 
that a new CFO was hired, Keith Manbeck, former senior vice president of digital finance, 
strategy management and business transformation at Kohl's, and the previous CFO, 
Glenda Flanagan, remained as senior advisor to the company. Additionally, five new 
independent directors were appointed, with combined experience in retail, food industry, 
finance and leadership experience. These directors included the former State Street CEO, 
                                                          
1 Direct quote by John Mackey. 
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Scott Powers; the chairman, president and CEO of Foot Locker, Ken Hicks; the former 
executive vice president, chief administrative and chief financial officer of Best Buy, 
Sharon McCollam; the founder and executive chairman of Morningstar, Joe Mansueto; 
and, founder, chairman and chief executive of Panera Bread, Ron Shaich. None of the 
new directors appointed were among the candidates Jana Partners had proposed. 
At this point in time, a sale was already a very viable possibility. Another well-known 
activist investor, Neuberger Berman, also pressured Whole Foods by sending a letter to 
the board, urging them to consider “possible strategic mergers, partnerships, joint 
ventures [and] alliances”. 
 
Amazon 
About Amazon and its history 
Amazon is a Seattle-based e-commerce and cloud computing company, founded by Jeff 
Bezos in 1994. The company started as an online bookstore in July 1995, when the first 
Amazon website came online, with the desire to “Get Big Fast”, not wanting to be a 
simple online retailer but instead a technology company that simplified transactions for 
costumers. This was evident through the way the company’s website was built, allowing 
for customizable searches by names, writers, publishers and even broader search 
parameters for more undecided readers, such as mood, reading habits and preferences. 
Amazon went public in May 1997 and invested their IPO proceeds into improving their 
website and logistics, opening a new distribution centre in Delaware and expanding their 
Seattle centre, while also setting the goal for 95% same-day shipping for in-stocks items. 




The company’s great growth allowed for international expansion and to begin to branch 
out in the item selection in the following year. Amazon acquired two companies in 
Europe, Bookpages in the UK and Telebook in Germany, providing access to a new 
customer base. Internet Movie Database (IMDb) was bought to help their planned 
movement into the online video market, a very valuable resource and source of 
information. 1998 was also the year when Amazon announced the expansion into the 
online music business, allowing for costumers to listen to over 225 thousand sound clips 
before purchasing. 
The trend continued in the following decade, with focus on growth as opposed to profits, 
both organically and inorganically (see Exhibit 9 for timeline for major M&A deals by 
Amazon). More products and services were added throughout the years, resulting in 
Amazon becoming the largest internet-based retailer in the world (see Exhibit 10 for 
Amazon financial data). 
 
Products and Services 
Amazon sells many different kinds of products, such as apparel, electronics, books, tools 
and consumer goods, on the company’s buy-it-now marketplace. It works worldwide as 
a B2B2C business model, where third parties can sell through their websites, and a B2C 
business model, where Amazon sells its own products, the most well-known being Echo 
& Alexa devices, the Fire tablets, Fire TV and the Kindle e-reader (see Exhibit 11 for 
Amazon core countries). 
Arguably Amazon’s most notable service is Amazon Prime. This is a yearly subscription 
programme costing $99 (increased in 2014 from $79 – price when launched in 2005) that 
offers free two-day shipping for all eligible purchases and discount on one-day shipping. 
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It was first launched in the United States in 2005 and by 2016 was also available in 
Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy, Canada and India. 
Throughout the years, Amazon bundled other services to the Amazon Prime subscription 
(likely the one of the reasons for the price increase in 2014) to render it more appealing 
and to gain consumer loyalty. Adding to the shipping advantages, Amazon Prime offers 
many advantage in the entertainment scene, such as Prime Video, a service similar to 
Netflix, where subscribers have on-demand access to thousands of movies and shows to 
watch on their devices; Prime Music, that allows for music streaming and downloads for 
offline use; Prime Reading, providing unlimited access to thousands of books, magazines 
and audiobooks; Twitch Prime, a gaming streaming platform where this exclusive 
membership allows for free access and pre-orders to certain videogames, ad-free viewing 
and a free subscription to a streamer of the subscriber’s choosing; Prime Photo, an 
unlimited storage and image sharing platform. Other benefits include early access to 
certain deals and receiving money back on their purchases using Amazon cards. 
Amazon’s cloud computing services are grouped under Amazon Web Services. These are 
aimed mostly at businesses and content creators and encompasses several computer-based 
solutions for clients in areas such as computing, storage, network & content delivery, 
developer tools, machine learning, analytics and augmented/virtual reality. Despite being 
Amazon’s smallest revenue driver, the main two being “North America” and 
“International” (geographical distinctions for their e-commerce core business), 
accounting for about 9% of revenue in 2016, it is Amazon’s fastest growing division, with 
a net sales growth of 70% in 2015 and 55% in 2016. It is also Amazon’s most profitable 
division in terms of operating income, accounting for 67.5% of Amazon’s operating 





Amazon’s product and service offering is extremely diverse but not necessarily what 
distinguishes Amazon from the competition. The incredible logistics that allow the 
company to provide such reliable delivery and fast response times is part of the backbone 
that makes operations run smoothly. Amazon encourages sellers to use Fulfilment by 
Amazon, which allows sellers to create their own product listings on Amazon websites 
and ship the products to Amazon fulfilment centres rather than the buyer directly. Once 
customers place their orders on the Amazon website, the company itself handles the 
shipping and allows for tracking information on the product bought. This system allows 
for a full control over the supply chain, allowing the company to deliver on their promise 
for Amazon Prime subscribers of free 1- and 2-day shipping for eligible products. There 
is also the added security for the buyer, because he/she knows exactly where to ship the 
products and doesn’t have to worry about complicated logistics for distant deliveries, and 
for the seller, who has the Amazon promise of timely and secure delivery of their orders.    
Amazon also developed their own payment system, Amazon Pay, because transaction 
safety isn’t limited to the physical delivery of the products; the financial aspect of the 
transaction is also important. This service allows shoppers to make purchases on the 
Amazon website (and third-party websites that accept the service as a payment method) 
with “no transaction fees, no membership fee, no currency conversion fee, no foreign 
transaction fee and no other fees”. 
 
Day 1 Mentality and Customer Obsession 
“Day 1” are probably the best words to describe Jeff Bezos’ philosophy for Amazon, so 
much so that he attaches his first letter to shareholders written in 1997 (year of the 
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Amazon IPO) to the yearly shareholder letter and to the annual report and has even named 
Amazon’s Seattle office building after it. 
“Day 2 is stasis. Followed by irrelevance. Followed by excruciating, painful decline. 
Followed by death. And that is why it is always Day 1. (…) Staying in Day 1 requires you 
to experiment patiently, accept failures, plant seeds, protect saplings, and double down 
when you see customer delight. A customer-obsessed culture best creates the conditions 
where all of that can happen.” – Jeff Bezos, in Annual Letter to Shareholders 2016. 
 
Amazon’s transition into the Grocery industry and Brick-and-Mortar 
Amazon Fresh was Amazon’s first major endeavour in the grocery business. This was a 
grocery delivery service launched in 2007, only available in certain major US cities with 
large metropolitan areas. However, the online grocery business was still emerging. Only 
around 12% of US consumers bought grocery online in 2016, of which the greatest 
costumers were millennials. Given that grocery stores still account for 46% of all store-
based retail, it would be unwise to miss out on such as a large component of their 
consumers’ lives. Whole Foods Market was a change to dive in head-first into the grocery 
industry, as Amazon hoped to bundle further into their products and services, to the point 
where it is, as Jeff Bezos puts it, “such a good value, you’d be irresponsible not to be a 
member”.  
In December 2016, Amazon launched a trial grocery store in Seattle for its employees 
called Amazon Go where the shoppers could simply grab whichever items they wished 
to purchase and, through a variety of sensors, their Amazon account would be 
automatically charged with the bill for whatever they picked up from the store, completely 
negating the existence of queues. The project, despite innovative and guided by their 
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consumer-obsession, the brick-and-mortar strategy is a significant shift from Amazon’s 
historical online-only presence.  
The strategic shift began before Amazon Go, with the opening of Amazon Books in late 
2015, a physical bookstore in Seattle. This grew to 13 stores by late 2017, with plans to 
open at least three more. The advantage of having physical stores is the ability to market 
themselves to a greater audience and improve consumer relations to ultimately boost 
online traffic and sales. The website and bookstore are still strongly linked. The books 
available at the bookstores are selected according to pre-order and ratings on the 
Amazon.com website and each book is displayed such that the barcode is visible to allow 
the use of the Amazon app to check prices. 
This trend has been noticed among other online retailers, of which most are clothing and 
specialty stores such as Casper, Bonobos, Warby Parker and Birchbox. The competitive 
and saturated e-commerce market made it harder for companies to stand out and “online 
real estate” was becoming more expensive too. For example, according to L2 Inc, Macy’s 
and Nordstrom spent $6.4 million and $4 million respectively in Q1 2015 in paid search 
listings for the top 1000 apparel-related keywords. While the trend going forward was 
somewhat unpredictable and guided by consumer preferences, it seemed e-commerce and 
brick-and-mortar were suitable complements.  
 
A Natural Marriage? 
Amazon remained secretive as to why they wanted to buy the organic grocer but they had 
the potential of solving two of Whole Foods’ major problems. The first problem haunting 
the organic grocer was its image of being too expensive, earning it the “Whole Paycheck” 
nickname. Conveniently, Amazon was known for its low-price offerings and a take-over 
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could be sufficient for this image to be overturned. Another common critique received by 
Whole Foods was the lack of customer loyalty programme, which Amazon Prime could 
solve.  
The benefits from the acquisition of Whole Foods weren’t limited to the grocery industry. 
Amazon had also made a name for themselves with the convenient and speedy delivery 
of their products, especially to Prime members. Whole Food stores were typically located 
in dense urban areas, with affluent consumers. According to Quartz, a third of American 
households with an annual income of over $100 000 lived within 3 miles of a Whole 
Foods. With infrastructure closer to the consumer, they would be able to increase the 
efficiency of their supply chain. Furthermore, they would be able to introduce new 
services, like Amazon Lockers, that allowed their shoppers use their conveniently-located 
stores to return and pick-up orders placed on Amazon websites. 
 
The Offer  
Whole Foods had six different potential buyers at the time other than Amazon, including 
a suggested “merger of equals”, a commercial agreement from a competitor and four 
private equity firms looking to buy out the grocer, according to an SEC filing.  
Amazon, using Goldman Sachs as their financial advisor, was very aggressive in their 
negotiations: it offered a bid at $41 per share (when Whole Foods Market was trading at 
$35) and made it very clear that that secrecy of the bid was crucial and that if any there 
were any leaks, Amazon would exit the negotiations.  
Whole Foods management wasn’t confident that the offers from the private equity firms 
would be higher than the one Amazon made, as was indicated by their financial advisor 
Evercore, but counter-offered at $45. Amazon was not happy and informed Whole Foods 
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that Amazon was considering whether it would just walk away or counter-offer, and 
would be looking at new opportunities elsewhere in the meantime.  
Amazon made a final offer of $42 per share, which it expected to fund by issuing debt 
(see Exhibit 12 for bonds issued to finance the deal), expecting a quick response. To 
avoid a bid war, they stated “Amazon.com expected that the Company would not approach 
other potential bidders while the Company was negotiating with Amazon.com”. Whole 
Foods shareholders had to respond to the offer, being called to vote by the management 
who unanimously recommended that shareholders voted “YES”. 
Jana Partners had to decide on how to proceed. Whole Foods Market shares were trading 
above the announced $42 per share, in the expectation that higher bids would arise. The 
risk of the Amazon deal was also a consideration to take into account, given their firmly 
stated unwillingness to participate in a bid war. Should they sell their position before the 
deal takes place in order to take advantage of the overshoot? Should they encourage other 
shareholders to vote “No” on the deal to wait for better offers or continue their efforts to 








Exhibit 1 – Letter to Whole Foods Market Shareholders for Merger Approval 
 
 






















Source: Whole Foods website. 
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Statement of Operations  
 
Source: Whole Foods Market Annual Reports. 
 
Unaudited Cash Flow Projects by Management Team 
 
Source: SEC Filing. 
 
Other information 
Cost of debt: 5.20%     Source: Annual Reports. 
US 10Y Bond Yield: 2.35%    Source: Bloomberg. 




Exhibit 6 – U.S. Organic Sales and Growth 2006-2015 
 
 
 Source: Organic Trade Association. 
 
Exhibit 7 – Whole Foods Market Peer Data 
 
 
Source: Duff & Phelps; Bloomberg; Annual Reports.  
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Source: Duff & Phelps; SEC.  
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Exhibit 9 – Amazon Major Acquisition Timeline 
 
 











Statement of Operations 
 
 




Exhibit 11 – Amazon’s Core Countries 
 











Exhibit 12 – Amazon Debt Issuance for Deal Financing 
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THESIS TEACHING NOTES 
Case Synopsis 
In June 2017, Amazon.com Inc announced its plans to acquire Whole Foods Market for 
$42 per share, a 27% premium on the closing price of the previous day. Whole Foods 
Market had been struggling and this was a potential way to deliver value for their 
shareholders and Amazon saw the target as an opportunity to join the food retail business 
that it had already tried to develop organically in the past. In the months leading up to the 
acquisition announcement, Jana Partners, an activist hedge fund, entered a minority 
position by purchasing ~9% of the Whole Foods Market outstanding shares and began a 
public battle against the management of the organic grocer to overhaul the company and 
push towards a sale. With Amazon’s announcement and the voting for its approval came 
up, Jana needed to decide how to proceed. 
 
Teaching Purpose 
The following teaching note should be used in conjunction with the respective case study, 
focusing on the following teachings: (a) financial analysis of a target company; (b) 
sources of value creation in a merger, (c) value creation through shareholder activism; (d) 
company valuation using different methods; (e) advantages and limitations of different 
valuation multiples; (f) EPS fallacy as a measure of value creation. All calculations are 
provided in the case’s Excel spreadsheets. 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What made Whole Foods Market an appealing target for a takeover? 
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Whole Foods Market was a struggling company, and there are several pieces of evidence 
that can be used to justify the claim. 
Looking at the statements of operations, the evolution of several figures can be analysed 
by the students. Despite positive sales growth from 2014 to 2016, the growth rate 
decreases significantly: 8.4% from 2014 to 2015 and 2.2% from 2015 to 2016. Gross 
margin decreases only slightly from 2014 to 2016 (35.5% to 34.4%), and so does 
operating margin (6.6% to 5.5%), suggesting difficulties in cost efficiency. The students 
can point out that this can be justified by the decrease in same-store sales mentioned in 
the case, so the increase in sales is due to the opening of new stores as opposed to growth 
of existing stores. This is also reflected on the net profit margin, decreasing from 4.1% in 
2014 to 3.5% in 2015 to 3.2% in 2016. 
Another good measure students can analyse is the evolution of ROIC, calculating using 
the values for Debt and Equity from the Balance Sheet and the net income from the 
statements of operations. From 2014 to 2015 to 2016, ROIC decreases from 14.9% to 
14.0% to 11.9% respectively (see Exhibit 1 of Teaching Notes for calculations). 
Ultimately, this data is reflected on the Whole Foods Market’s stock price, whose 
cumulative returns since early 2015 can be seen compared to S&P500 returns. Not only 
are the stock’s returns much lower than the chosen benchmark, the company lost half its 
value since its peak in 2015, rising at the end of the data set when Jana Partners disclosed 
their position in an SEC filing on April 10th 2017 as the market expected a possible sale 
to come in the future. 
 
2. Why would Amazon want to buy Whole Foods Market? What sources of value 
creation are there for Amazon to gain with the Whole Foods acquisition? 
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Amazon remained somewhat secretive regarding their future plans for Whole Foods but 
possible sources of synergies in an uncommon partnership in an M&A deal can be 
discussed. 
Amazon had already shown a desire to enter the grocery industry through previous 
endeavours such as Amazon Fresh and Amazon Go, although their development and 
success was somewhat limited. An acquisition of a well-established company such as 
Whole Foods Market allows for a jump start towards establishing a food retail business 
line. This could easily be integrated with Amazon’s already existing Prime programme 
and using it to create incentives to shop at Whole Foods, such as discounts in other 
Amazon services or products by shopping at Whole Foods or discounts at Whole Foods 
by purchasing other Amazon products. 
The strategic implications of acquiring a company heavily focused on a brick-and-mortar 
are relevant. Amazon made a reputation for itself as an e-commerce company but 
increased its physical presence by opening several bookstores from late 2015 onwards. 
The reasons for this are mostly speculative due to the company’s secrecy regarding the 
subject but possible advantages include greater contact and understanding of their 
costumers, physical marketing to counteract an increasingly saturated and expensive e-
commerce, while leveraging on their existing know-how of their shoppers habits and 
likes. 
The convenience of Amazon’s speedy delivery time, particularly for Amazon Prime 
subscribers, comes at the cost of increased transaction control to guarantee their ability to 
deliver on their word. The privileged location of Whole Foods Market stores allows for 
greater proximity to their customers (and future, potential customers), providing potential 
hubs for storage in addition to the possibility of having a collection point for consumers 




3. What is shareholder activism, what is its purpose and how is value created by 
activist shareholders? 
An activist shareholder is an investor that uses his/her power as an equity holder to 
pressure the management of the company to motivate changes. Ultimately, the goal is to 
create value and profit from the transaction. This type of investing is particularly 
attractive due to the possible impact in relation to the stake acquired. Relatively small 
stakes, such as the one Jana Partners acquired in Whole Foods prior to the Amazon 
acquisition (under 9%), may be sufficient to motivate the intended changes and create 
value. This contrasts with takeover bids, which not only require much larger capital 
investments but often also a control premium. 
Value can be created through different ways. In the case, we can see the first attempt by 
Jana Partners, who tried to replace 4 directors. Bringing in complying directors would 
make it much easier to implement the ideas they had for the company. Naturally, the 
company’s management didn’t take this well and a proxy fight was triggered. Given that 
the expectation for new management already existed, even from other shareholders, they 
brought in 5 new directors of their own choosing to comply with the shareholders’ 
demands without losing control of the company to Jana.  
The offer Whole Foods made to bring in only 2 directors from those suggested by Jana 
was smart, as the agreement would diminish the public stirring going on but wouldn’t 
cause enough change to the board such that they wouldn’t be able to control the company. 
Jana was also smart to decline, as they knew that 2 directors would be insufficient for 
them to reach their goals. 
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The inability to influence and to carry out their initial plan led to a more aggressive 
approach by Jana. They continued their public dispute against the Whole Foods, placing 
a target on their back to be acquired. To a certain extent, Jana made it so that a sale seemed 
to be the most reasonable and likely solution to be accepted by both the shareholders and 
the management: Jana Partners could profit from an acquisition premium and the Whole 
Foods management team could get Jana off the back and discuss changes with a different, 
more flexible party (the acquirer – Amazon). Unsurprisingly, this is what happened 
netting Jana Partners a profit of around $300m from the transaction (38% return) over a 
period of only a few months. 
In some cases, such as in past investments by Jana mentioned in the case, spin-
offs/divestitures may create value when the sum of parts worth more than the whole. This 
can happen when companies hold assets that are underperforming due to company 
negligence or lack of expertise. Investors may wish to invest exclusively in a particular 
business unit of a company but are unable to do so because they share the same corporate 
umbrella as other business units, so the separation can also provide more liquidity to the 
assets in question. 
 
4. Provide a valuation analysis on Whole Foods Market. Do you think Amazon’s 
offer is reasonable? 
The data available in the case allows for several types of valuation: DCF, Trading 
Multiples and Transaction Multiples (and combinations).  
The DCF can be done using the Whole Foods Market’s management’s projections for 
Free Cash Flows. To calculate the WACC, students must first arrive at the cost of equity 
(re) and should use the given cost of debt.  
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As for the cost of equity, the unlevered industry Beta should be derived by unlevering the 
Beta for Whole Foods Market’s peers and averaging the Beta. The students should use 
the organic grocers’ beta and not all the given betas. They should recognize that the 
organic food industry is more cyclical than the more diversified food retail industry as 
whole. Using the betas for all the listed companies would result in a lower Beta and would 
overvalue the company. This Beta should then be relevered using Whole Foods Market’s 
capital structure. Using the risk-free rate (US long-term bond yield) and the market risk 
premium (from Damodaran) in the case, the re is calculated. Using the rd given in the case 
and a tax rate of 35%, the resulting WACC is 7.00%. The Free Cash Flows should be 
discounted at this rate and the terminal value should be added onto the discounted cash 
flows. The terminal value can be calculated using a perpetuity, in which case a perpetuity 
growth should be assumed, or using a multiple on one of the cash flow metrics. Using a 
perpetuity growth rate of 2%, the final valuation for the company’s equity would be $14 
843 million ($45.4 per share) (see Exhibit 2 of Teaching Notes for DCF full 
calculations). 
Another possible valuation method is through trading multiples. From the data available 
in the annexes, the available multiples are EV/Sales and EV/EBITDA. Different 
companies are available for comparison, split into organic retailers, small/mid cap 
retailers and large cap retailers. For the same reason stated in the DCF valuation, students 
should use the multiple for organic retailers because those are Whole Foods Market’s 
“true” peers, despite the more limited sample.   
To obtain the multiple itself, there is also the possibility of taking either the average or 
the median of the multiples. The advantage of using the median instead of the mean is to 
filter out the outliers, where the average is much more sensitive to extreme data points. 
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The difference in measures is relatively small for the EV/EBITDA multiple but is more 
significant in the EV/Sales multiple, as can be seen in the tables below:  
 
Trading Multiples 
  EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average 0.75x 8.73x 
Median 0.65x 8.20x 
      
Equity Valuation 
(in $ million) 
EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average 11,215.25 9,919.73 
Median 9,626.55 9,271.20 
 
(see Exhibit 3 of Teaching Notes for trading multiples calculations) 
A third valuation method is through comparable transactions. The available transactions 
are for the food retail industry, only one referring specifically to the acquisition of an 
organic grocer (The Fresh Market, Inc by Apollo Global Management). Therefore, this is 
the only “true” comparable transaction. The EV/EBITDA multiple (7.1x) is far lower than 
that of the Whole Foods Market’s (11.9x) (see Exhibit 4 of Teaching Notes), which 
could be due to a number of company-specific factors and not necessarily regarding the 
organic grocer industry. The valuation method should be considered nonetheless, 
discussing the issues of its reliability due to the lack of other M&A deals for organic food 
retailers.  
 
For all valuation methods, students can also choose to have a sensitivity analysis on 
important variables. For the DCF, variables like the WACC and perpetuity growth rate 
would be sensible choices, whereas for the other two valuation methods, the sensitivity 
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analysis would be for the multiple itself. If performed, this provides valuation ranges 
where the “true” value of the company is likely to reside. All of the valuations should be 
taken into account (e.g.: football field graph) when providing their opinion regarding 
Amazon’s offer.  
Overall, the Amazon offer seems very appealing. The DCF valuation under the stated 
assumption values the company above the offer by Amazon but it is arguable that the 
projected cash flows seem inflated, given the company’s track record over the previous 3 
years. This is not particularly surprising, given that these are unaudited cash flow 
projections made by the management team and it is likely that they are overly optimistic 
regarding the company’s future. The market sure seems to think differently than the 
management team, given the price discrepancy between the DCF and trading price (the 
Amazon offer of $42 per share already represented a premium of 27% to the price before 
the announcement and 41% premium to the price before the shareholder activism disputes 
became public). The offer is also very attractive when compared to the trading multiples 
for organic grocers, and even more attractive when compared to the comparable 
transaction (although the limitations for this valuation have already been stated). 
 
5. Do you think EV/EBITDA and EV/Revenue are good financial measures for 
multiple valuation? Discuss their advantages and disadvantages, suggesting other 
viable alternatives. 
EV/EBITDA is one of the most commonly used multiples in the financial industry for 
valuation. EBITDA is a good proxy for Free Cash Flow because of its sensitivity to the 
operations of the company (revenue generation and cost efficiency), while remaining 
unaffected by accounting gimmicks and tax treatments. The ratio allows for easy 
comparison of different companies within the same industry, as it also independent of 
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capital structure. The ratio can become meaningless in the scenario where a company is 
struggling and its costs exceed their revenues for a particular year, making the EBITDA 
negative and the ratio obsolete. 
EV/Sales has similar advantages, in that Sales is a hard number to manipulate and there 
is somewhat reflective to the situation of the company but excludes very useful 
information like the cost structure. It also overcomes the issue of the possibility for a 
negative ratio (although a negative EV is still possible), as Sales must be non-negative. 
Variations upon these multiples are common, often adjusted according to the industry. 
Common alternatives include EV/EBIT or adjustments to the EBIDA such as subtracting 
Capital Expenditures or Changes to Net Working Capital. The idea is to make the estimate 
as close to FCF as possible while keeping it an accurate measure. These types of 
adjustments are usually employed in capital intensive industries, where large investments 
are required every year to run the business and therefore should be taken into account, 
although this is not the case for the grocer industry. 
Yet another viable alternative, also heavily used in the financial industry, is the P/E Ratio. 
The ratio determines how much the average investor is willing to pay for every dollar of 
that company’s earnings. It can be a good measure to compare companies within the same 
industry, as the ratio reflects the market sentiment regarding a company’s future growth 
prospects (i.e.: a company with a higher P/E than their peers is believed to have greater 
growth prospects than the peers). The limitations with P/E ratio is that a company can 
much more easily manipulate its earnings than they can, for example, its EBITDA 
because it is affected by accounting methods. There is an incentive to do so, for example, 
to pay less taxes on corporate earnings. P/E ratio is also affected by market conditions, 
particularly in times of higher inflation, where inventory and depreciation costs are 




6. What impact would the Amazon – Whole Foods merger have on Amazon EPS, 
assuming no synergies? What can you conclude about the value created by the 
acquisition? 
This question serves to allow students to reach two important conclusions: 1. EPS 
accretion doesn’t necessarily mean value is being created; 2. Debt tax shield can be used 
to compensate acquisition premiums. 
Both conclusions can be proven mathematically. A possibility would be to calculate 
impact on Amazon EPS assuming acquisition with cash on-hand (i.e. Amazon # of shares 
doesn’t change). In this scenario, no value is created; in fact, value is destroyed because 
the premium is paid but there is no synergies to compensate for it. However, the EPS 
increases from $4.90 to $5.95. The fallacy that EPS accretion = value creation is evident 
here, because EPS increases despite value being destroyed. The reason for the accretion 
is Amazon’s higher P/E (203.1) compared to Whole Foods’ P/E (27.1), meaning the 
Whole Foods earnings are now priced higher because they have moved into Amazon’s 
financial statements. 
The second conclusion can be shown assuming 100% debt financing, with an average 
cost of debt of 3.46% - the average coupon rate for the debt emitted to finance the deal 
(tax rate of 35% assumed).  The value created by the tax shield is added onto the Amazon 
market cap (PV of tax shield – premium paid) and the debt repayment is subtracted from 
the sum of net incomes. Together, EPS increases from $4.90 to $5.31. In this case, value 
is created despite not having synergies purely from the leverage. Students can further 
discuss that although leverage can create value in M&A, there are other possible 
implications, such as increased default risk and limiting future financing options (like 
inability to borrow more or increased cost of debt). 
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Teaching Notes Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 of Teaching Notes – Calculations for Whole Foods financial indicators 
(in million $) 2014 2015 2016 
Sales 14,194.0 15,389.0 15,724.0 
Growth - 8.4% 2.2% 
COGS + Occupancy costs 9,150.0 9,973.0 10,313.0 
Gross Profit 5,044.0 5,416.0 5,411.0 
Gross Margin 35.5% 35.2% 34.4% 
SG&A expenses 4,032.0 4,472.0 4,477.0 
Pre-opening expenses 67.0 67.0 64.0 
Relocation, store closure and lease termination 
costs 11.0 16.0 13.0 
Operating income 934.0 861.0 857.0 
Operating Margin 6.6% 5.6% 5.5% 
Interest expense 0.0 0.0 -41.0 
Investment and other income 12.0 17.0 11.0 
Income before income taxes 946.0 878.0 827.0 
Provision for income taxes 367.0 342.0 320.0 
Net income 579.0 536.0 507.0 
Margin 4.1% 3.5% 3.2% 
        
Net Debt1 -128 -172 700 
Book value of Equity 3813 3769 3224 
ROIC2 16.5% 15.6% 14.2% 
 








Exhibit 2 of Teaching Notes – Whole Foods Market DCF Valuation 
Unlevered Beta 
 
Average Unlevered Beta: 0.85 
Levered Beta 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑈 × [1 + (1 − 𝑡) ×
𝐷
𝐸
] = 0.85 × [1 + (1 − 0.35) ×
1051
3224
] = 1.02 
Cost of Equity (using Average Unlevered Beta) and Cost of Debt 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝐿 × 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 2.35% + 1.02 × 5.69% = 8.18% 
𝑟𝑑 = 5.20% 
WACC 






× (1 − 𝑡) = 7.00% 
Equity Value 
WFM Projections   1 2 3 4 5 
  2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022+ 
Revenue 15,887 16,490 17,339 18,217 19,238   
EBITDA 1,216 1,331 1,656 1,815 1,949 1,988 
FCF 324 422 639 738 814 830 
Discounted CF 324 394 558 602 621 12,668* 
 
*assumed perpetuity growth rate of 2% 
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 = $14 843 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛  





Sprouts Farmers Market, Inc. 673 372 1.00 0.74 
The Fresh Market, Inc. 363 -27 1.33 1.44 
Natural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage, 
Inc. 
127 55 0.52 0.36 
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Exhibit 3 of Teaching Notes - Trading Multiples for Organic Grocers 
Price Paid 13,725 
Debt 1,051 
Cash 351 
Implied EV 14,425 
Revenue (2017E) 15,887 





  EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average 0.75x 8.73x 
Median 0.65x 8.20x 
      
Equity Valuation 
(in $ million) 
EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average 11,215.25 9,919.73 
Median 9,626.55 9,271.20 
 
Transaction Multiples 
  EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average - 7.10x 
Median - 7.10x 
      
Equity Valuation 
(in $ million) 
EV/Sales EV/EBITDA 
Average - 7,933.60 




Exhibit 4 of Teaching Notes – EPS Calculations 
CASH ON HAND AND NO SYNERGIES     
  Amazon  Whole Foods Combined 
Number of shares (diluted - in millions) 484.0 326.9 484.01 
Market Cap (million $) 481,662.3 13,725.3 478,744.32 
Net Income (million $) 2,371.0 507.0 2,878.03 
Share Price ($) 995.2 42.0 989.14 
EPS ($) 4.90 1.55 5.955 
P/E 203.1 27.1 166.36 
 
1 Assumed payment with cash on hand (no share issuance needed) 
2 No synergies: Final Market cap = Amazon market cap – premium paid (value destroyed) 
3 Sum of net incomes 
4 New share price = Market Cap / Number of Shares 
5 EPS = Net Income / Number of Shares 
6 P/E = Market Cap / Net Income 
 
100% DEBT FINANCING AND NO SYNERGIES     
  Amazon  Whole Foods Combined 
Number of shares (diluted - in millions) 484.0 326.9 484.0 
Market Cap (million $) 481,662.3 13,725.3 483,548.27 
Net Income (million $) 2,371.0 507.0 2,569.58 
Share Price ($) 995.2 42.0 999.1 
EPS ($) 4.90 1.55 5.31 
P/E 203.1 27.1 188.2 
 
7 Final Market Cap = Amazon Market + Tax Shield – Premium Paid 
  Tax Shield = Price Paid × Tax Rate 
 
8 Final Net Income = Sum of Net Incomes – [Cost of Debt × Price Paid × (1 – Tax Rate)] 
 
Cost of debt for Amazon for deal financing 
Maturity Coupon rate Issue size (mm) 
21/08/2020 1.90% 1000 
22/08/2023 2.40% 1000 
22/08/2024 2.80% 2000 
22/08/2027 3.15% 3500 
22/08/2037 3.88% 2750 
22/08/2047 4.05% 3500 
22/08/2057 4.25% 2250 
    16000 
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𝑟𝑑 = ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ×
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
= 3.46% 
